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a b s t r a c t
Within the paradigm of physical layer security, a physical layer characteristic is used as a
common source of randomness to generate the secret key. This key is then used to encrypt
the data to hide information from eavesdroppers. In this paper, we survey the most recent
common sources of randomness used to generate the secret key.We present the steps used
to extract the secret key from the estimated common source of randomness. We describe
the metrics used to evaluate the strength of the generated key. We follow that with a
qualitative comparison between different common sources of randomness along with a
proposed new direction which capitalizes on hybridization of sources of randomness. We
conclude by a discussion about current open research problems in secret key generation.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ac1. Introduction
The broadcast nature of wireless communications im-
poses the risk of information leakage to adversarial users
or unauthorized receivers. Therefore, information secu-
rity between the intended users remains a challenging is-
sue. Currently, wireless security relies on cryptographic
techniques and protocols that lie at the upper layers of
the wireless network. One main drawback of these exist-
ing techniques is the necessity of a complex key manage-
ment scheme in the case of symmetric ciphers and high
computational complexity in the case of asymmetric ci-
phers. Cryptographic techniques mandate the exchange
of encryption keys at one point during the encryption—
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licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).decryption process. This poses a serious threat to the
secrecy of the whole communication session (i.e., be-
comes a security bottleneck). Minimization of the secu-
rity risk, stemming from key exchange mechanisms, is the
main reason that cryptographic secrecy opts for key reuse
(i.e., using the same key for multiple packet encryptions),
which introduces another secrecy weakness allowing an
eavesdropper to have more chances on guessing the en-
cryption key. Physical layer security relies on randomness
characteristics inherent in the communication channels,
which are common to the two trusted parties, which being
unknown to a potential eavesdropper. Thus, key exchange
is no longermandatory and key renewal is potentially pos-
sible for every packet transmission rendering the secrecy
potential higher than upper layers cryptographic methods
while maintaining lower computational complexity [1].
The wiretap channel, first presented by Wyner in
1975 [2], models two legitimate nodes communicating
through a noisy channel and an adversary receiving a
deteriorated version of the exchanged signals between the
cess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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studied the maximum secured transmission rate between
the two legitimate nodes while minimizing the amount of
information leaked to the wiretapper, i.e., eavesdropper.
The paper concluded that an ‘approximately perfect’ secret
communication between the two legitimate nodes is
achievable up to a specified rate without the use of
secret keys. This paper presented the early studies on the
theoretical aspects of physical layer security.
In relatively recent literature [3–5], researchers started
to exploit the randomness in some physical layer charac-
teristics as a potential source for key generation to guar-
antee information hiding from eavesdroppers or in other
words bound the amount of information leaked to un-
authorized nodes. These physical layer characteristics have
to be common to the two legitimate nodes and not shared
with the adversarial users. In other words, an estimation of
this physical layer characteristic should be approximately
the same if measured from the receivers of either of the
legitimate nodes. In addition, the physical layer character-
istic used to generate the secret key should be randomly
changing. Hence, the physical layer characteristic is also re-
ferred to as a common source of randomness.
Typically, in the wiretap channel paradigm, the
adversary (i.e., eavesdropper), Eve, can listen to all commu-
nications between the two trusted parties (i.e., communi-
cating nodes), Alice and Bob. Eve can estimate the channel
between itself and bothAlice andBob. In addition, it can es-
timate the distances between itself and Alice and Bob. Eve
canmove freely within the field and can visit any of the lo-
cations where either Alice or Bob was or will be in the fu-
ture. Eve, however, cannot be in very close proximity (i.e.,
within few wavelengths) to either Alice or Bob to ensure
that the collected signals are not correlated.1 There is no
limitation on the number of the antennas Eve is equipped
with nor its computational capabilities. It is assumed that
Eve is not capable of pursuing denial of service attack, per-
son in themiddle attack or jamming attack.2 Therefore, we
assume that Eve is a passive adversary.
The objective of this survey is to present the fundamen-
tals of secret key generation in an explicit way. The flow
of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sur-
vey the most common physical layer characteristics used
as common sources of randomness to generate the secret
key. The steps used to extract the key from the estimated
physical layer characteristic are presented in Section 3.We
then present the metrics used to evaluate the strength of
the secret key in Section 4 followed by a discussion in Sec-
tion 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Common sources of randomness
Fig. 1 depicts a typical system model for a secret key
generation system. Several characteristics of the physical
layer link between the two communicating nodes are
shared between the two legitimate nodes, while the
eavesdropper can only measure them between itself and
between both nodes.
1 From a practical perspective this would make the presence of Eve
detectable by either Alice or Bob.
2 The reader is referred to the references within [1] for further
information on these types of attacks, called active attacks.Fig. 1. System model.
2.1. Channel estimates
One well known characteristic of the communication
channel is reciprocity. When two antennas communicate
by radiating the same signal through a linear and isotropic
channel, the received signals by each antenna will be
identical. This is mainly because of the reciprocity of the
radiating and receiving antenna pattern.
Current physical layer security techniques are based
on channel reciprocity assumption. One of the pioneer-
ing work on secret key generation based on channel reci-
procity was first presented in [3]. They concluded that the
maximum size of the generated secret keymainly depends
on the mutual information between the channel estimates
at the two legitimate nodes. They also derived an expres-
sion for the mutual information for a general multipath
channel. The most common feature of the channel charac-
teristics that iswidely used is channel gain;mainly because
of its ease of implementation [6,7]. In [6], the authors stud-
ied the channel probing rate effect on the secret key rate
for different doppler shifts. They found that secret key
rate increases as the probing rate increases and saturates
at 20 kHz probing rate for the worst case doppler shift
they assumed of 100 Hz. The smaller the doppler shift the
smaller the probing rate required to saturate the secret
key rate. In [7], the authors observed that as the carrier
frequency increases, the probing rate should increase to
achieve a suitable key rate. This ismainly because the chan-
nel’s temporal variation increases at higher carrier fre-
quencies.
Others exploit the channel phase to generate the se-
cret key as in [8–10]. Unlike the channel gain, the chan-
nel phase is uniformly distributed in narrowband fading
channels. The authors in [8,9], which were published in
1996 and 1998, respectively, were able to generate a long
key as compared to the conventional cryptographic tech-
niques from the estimated channel phase, while in [10],
they extend their system to the use of relay nodes. Another
channel based approach that generates a secondary ran-
dom process from the estimated channel gain or phase is
presented in [11]. The secret key generated from the sec-
ondary randomprocess provided a drastic improvement in
the achieved bit mismatch rate (BMR), which is the ratio of
the key bits that do not match at the two nodes.
One main advantage of exploiting channel estimates
to generate the secret key is its high key generation rate.
A. Badawy et al. / Physical Communication 19 (2016) 1–10 3However, a main drawback of exploiting the channel reci-
procity to generate secret keys is that the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at both receivers affects the reci-
procity of the channel measurements. Also, both nodes
must collect the measurement simultaneously [12].
2.2. Received signal strength indicator
Other reciprocal (common) parameters such as re-
ceived signal strength (RSS), which is a measure of the re-
ceived signal’s power, can be used as a common source of
randomness to generate the secret key [4]. Their results
showed that itwould require a signal to noise ratio (SNR) of
at least 20 dB to generate a secret with appropriate agree-
ment. A practical implementation of RSS based secret key
generation presented in [13] showed that it would require
a highly mobile scenario to generate a secret key with ac-
ceptable entropy, i.e., key randomness.
RSS is a very common metric that requires a simple
circuitry to be implemented. Nevertheless, its practical
utilization as a common source of randomness is limited
because its key bit generation rate is very low, particularly,
for mobile scenarios [14].
2.3. Distance
A recent physical layer security technique that is based
on the distance reciprocity to generate secret key bits is
presented in [5]. Secret key generation based on distance is
best suited for mobile scenario. The authors in [5] studied
the theoretical achievable secret key bit rate in terms of
the observation noise variance at the legitimate nodes
and the eavesdropper. They also tested their algorithm
using on-shelf radios. Most of the currently deployed
localization techniques exploit the RSS to estimate the
distance between the two communicating nodes [15].
Estimating the distance based on RSS requires an accurate
modelling of the channel between the nodes. Moreover,
it has a low estimation accuracy. This implies that the
secret key generated based on distance will have a high
BMR. There are other techniques to perform localization
which are based on the time of arrival (TOA). Although
localization based on TOA has a higher accuracy than RSS
based, it requires a clock synchronization between the two
nodes. Nevertheless, their estimation error is high at low
SNR (<0 dB).
Secret key generation based on distance is developed
for mobile scenarios where either of the two nodes are
moving and therefore the distance between the two
legitimate nodes changes. On the other hand, secret
key generated based on the distance between the two
communicating nodes is susceptible to be recovered by an
eavesdropper that is equipped with angle of arrival (AoA)
estimation capabilities. In this case, the eavesdropper
estimates theAoA for both the signal received from the two
nodes as well as the distances between itself and the two
nodes. The eavesdropper then easily estimates the distance
between the two nodes. Once the distance between the
nodes is estimated, the secret key is recovered by the
eavesdropper.2.4. Angle of arrival
The authors in [16] presented a secret key generation
algorithm that is based on the received signal’s AoA.
The authors compared the performance of generating a
secret key based on AoA using different AoA estimation
algorithms. They studied the root mean square error
(RMSE) of AoA estimation using different techniques and
they used that as an input to their simulation. The
AoA, when measured from a common reference, will be
equivalent at the two nodes. The authors studied the
performance of their algorithmwhen changing thenumber
of quantization bits and number of encoding bits. They also
exploited both azimuth and elevation angles.
One main advantage of using the AoA as a common
source of randomness is their high estimation accuracy at
low SNR levels. On the other hand, to do so, the receiver
must be equipped with AoA estimation capabilities
such as smart antenna systems as well as employing
a signal processing technique such as multiple signal
classification (MUSIC), which increases both hardware and
computational complexities.
3. Secret key generation steps
The steps to generate the secret key from the physical
layer characteristics are based on whether a single or
multiple common sources of randomness are used to
extract the key. It is inherited that both Alice and Bob
have already agreed on the common source(s), which
will be used to generate the key. The vast majority of
the current research work exploits only a single common
source of randomness, i.e., 1-D. We explore the possibility
of exploitingmultiple common sources of randomness and
show how the technique used to extract the secret keywill
differ. We first present the steps needed to extract the key
exploiting 1-D common source of randomness followed by
the addition needed to extract the key in case of multiple
common sources of randomness.
3.1. Exploiting 1-D common source of randomness to extract
the key
A block diagram of the steps needed to extract the key
from a single common source of randomness is shown in
Fig. 2. The block diagram includes all the necessary steps
involved in the process of secret key generation. The two
legitimate nodes start by an initializing phase followed
by estimating the underline common randomness. Quan-
tization, encoding, information reconciliation and privacy
amplification steps are followed to convert the common
randomness into a bit stream. The output of the block dia-
gram is the secret key, which both legitimate nodes use to
encrypt the transmitted data. The detailed steps are:
3.1.1. Initialization
This step is also known as beacon exchange. Both Alice
and Bob start to exchange signal from which the physical
layer characteristic will be estimated. Multiple beacon
exchange might be needed based on the required length
and rate of the key.
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randomness.
3.1.2. Common source of randomness estimation
Based on the received signal from the other legitimate
node, both Alice and Bob estimate the physical layer
characteristic. The estimation technique applied at either
Alice or Bob does not necessarily be the same. For example,
when exploiting the AoA to generate the secret key, Alice
can use the popularMUSIC technique to estimate the angle,
which is computationally expensive, while Bob can use the
conventional beam switching technique, which has much
lower hardware and computational complexities.
3.1.3. Quantization
Now that we have the common sources of randomness
estimated at both Alice and Bob, the third step is to
convert them into a bit stream suitable for the secret key
generation. The conventional secret key length is between
128 and 512 bits [6]. The most popular technique for
quantization is the uniform quantization. When using
nquan bits as the number of quantization bits, there
will exist 2nquan levels to quantize the common sources
of randomness. The quantized decimal values are then
converted into bits. Moreover, the authors in [17–19] use
a multi bit quantization technique, which uses multiple
thresholds and which differs based on the selection of the
threshold, to reduce the quantization error.
3.1.4. Encoding
Although uniform quantization is easy to implement,
increasing the quantization bit number, dramatically
degrades the performance of the algorithm since the bit
mismatch rate between the two communicating nodesincreases. In [20], an encoding algorithm is proposed to
tackle this problemwhere each uniformly quantized value
is encoded with multiple values, nencod bits.
3.1.5. Information reconciliation
The generated bit streams at Alice and Bob will have
some discrepancy, particularly at very low SNR levels.
This is due to several reasons such as interference, noise
and hardware limitations. A reconciliation protocol such
as the one presented in [21] will be used to minimize
the discrepancy. Both Alice and Bob first permute their
bit streams in the same way. Then they divide the
permuted bit stream into small blocks. Alice then sends
permutations and parities of each block to Bob. Bob then
compares the received parity information with the ones
he already processed. In case of a parity mismatch, Bob
changes his bits in this block to match the received
ones. Another approach for information reconciliation is
presented in [22], where the reconciliation step is treated
as a source coding with side information problem. In
this case, Alice compresses her collected common source
of randomness data and Bob decodes them with the
aid of his correlated collected data. Their reconciliation
procedure can accomplish security rates comparable to the
theoretical limits. Theirmethod relies onmultilevel coding
and optimized low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes,
where Alice applies a labelling function on its generated
bit stream then produces supplementary information for
Bob by calculating syndromes of the bit stream.
3.1.6. Privacy amplification
Although information reconciliation protocol leaks
minimum information, the eavesdropper can still use this
leaked information to guess the rest of the secret key.
Privacy amplification solves this issue by reducing the
length of the outputted bit stream. The generated bit
stream is shorter in length but higher in entropy. To do
so, both Alice and Bob apply a universal hash function
selected randomly from a set of hash functions known by
both Alice and Bob. Alice sends the number of the selected
hash function to Bob so that Bob can use the same hash
function.
3.2. Exploiting multiple common sources of randomness to
extract the key
In some cases, it is possible to collect multiple com-
mon sources of randomness simultaneously such as chan-
nel gain and phase, channel real and imaginary coefficients
[23], AoA azimuth and elevation angles [16], linear com-
bination of channel estimates in multiple antenna sce-
nario [24], RSS and distance, if distance estimation is
based on RSS and channel gain and distance [25]. In other
cases, the nodes might choose to collect multiple common
sources of randomness not simultaneously such as channel
gain and distance.
If multiple common sources of randomness were
estimated and the nodes intend to exploit them to generate
the secret key, the steps to generate the secret key are the
same as in Fig. 2 with a block added either at the raw data
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at the bit level after the Encoding block. The responsibility
of this block is to combine the multiple common sources
of randomness. We shall call the step of combining the
multiple common sources of randomness as the Fusion
Operation.
4. Metrics to evaluate the generated secret key
We present the most commonly used metrics to eval-
uate the generated secret key, which can be categorized
into two main categories: information theoretic metrics
and statistical metrics.
4.1. Information theoretic metrics
Wepresent three important information theoreticmet-
rics, which are the secret key rate, the secret key capacity
and the outage secret key capacity.
4.1.1. Secret key rate
The concept of secret key rate, R, was first presented in
the pioneeringwork ofMaurer in 1993 [26]. He derived the
upper and lower bounds on the secret key rate consider-
ing that the two legitimate nodes, Alice and Bob, have un-
limited access to a public channel, which Eve can listen to.
Both Alice and Bob observe n independent and identically
distributed random variable X and Y , respectively. X and
Y are denoted by X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn).
At any instant of time i, the corresponding observations at
Alice and Bob Xi and Yi are highly dependent. These obser-
vations are their estimates of the common source of ran-
domness. On the other hand, Eve observes a sequence of
observation denoted by Z . The upper bound on the gener-
ated secret key as defined by Maurer is given by:
S(X; Y ∥ Z) ≤ min [I(X; Y ), I(X; Y |Z)] (1)
where I(X; Y ) is the mutual information between X and Y
and I(X; Y |Z) is the mutual information between X and Y
given Z . The lower bound is given by
S(X; Y ∥ Z) ≥ max [I(Y ; X)− I(Z; X), I(X; Y )− I(Z; Y )] .
(2)
4.1.2. Secret key capacity
The supremum of the secret key rate is considered the
secret key capacity Cs. Although, secret key capacity in
general is still an open problem, Maurer defined it as:
Cs = max
PX
S(X; Y ∥ Z)
≤ min

max
PX
I(X; Y ),max
PX
I(X; Y |Z)

(3)
where PX is the probability density function of X .
4.1.3. Outage secret key capacity
The outage secret key capacity can be given by [27]:
O (R, δ) = Oeq (R, δ) ∪ Och (R, δ) , (4)where δ is the parameter that represents the error event
and Oeq (R, δ) and Och (R, δ) are the equivocation outage
and the channel outage, respectively. In the context of
exploiting the channel gain as a common source of
randomness, the equivocation outage, which happens
when the equivocation rate is less than R − δ, is defined
as:
Oeq (R, δ) =

1
n
H (W |Z, h) < R− δ

, (5)
where H(·) denotes the entropy rate, W is the message,
Z is the received signal by the eavesdropper and h is the
available channel state information at the eavesdropper.
The channel outage is given by:
Och (R, δ) =

1
n
I(T ; Y ) < R

, (6)
where T is the transmitted signal from Alice to Bob and Y
in this context is the received signal by Bob.
4.2. Statistical metrics
The statistical tests applied on the secret key generated
based on a physical layer characteristic are borrowed from
the conventional cryptography test. As stated in [28] ‘‘Each
statistical test determineswhether the sequence possesses
a certain attribute that a truly random sequence would
be likely to exhibit; the conclusion of each test is not
definite, but rather probabilistic’’. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) (US Department of
Commerce) [29] provides tools (Public key interoperability
test suite certification path validation [30]) to evaluate the
statistical metrics of the generated secret key. The tools
are developed to evaluate the performance of conventional
cryptographic techniques, however the generated key
through a physical layer characteristic can be tested using
the provided tools by NIST. There are five basic statistical
tests presented in [28]. We add a more recent test applied
on the generated secret key, which is the bit mismatch
rate between the key generated at Alice and Bob. For a
generated secret key s of length N bits, the six tests are:
4.2.1. Frequency test
The objective of this test is to determine if the number
of 1’s and 0’s are approximately the same, as predicted for
a random binary sequence.
4.2.2. Serial test
The objective of this test is to determine if the number
of occurrences of the two bit subsequences 00, 01, 10, and
11 are approximately the same, as predicted for a random
binary sequence.
4.2.3. Poker test
To apply the poker test, the generated key s is divided
into k non-overlapping subsequences of length m. The
objective of this test is to determine if the number of
occurrences of each of the subsequences of length m is
approximately the same, as predicted for a random binary
sequence. If the length of the subsequence m = 1, the
poker test reduces to the frequency test.
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A qualitative comparison between exploiting current state-of-the-art common sources of randomness.
Channel estimates RSS Distance AoA
Hardware complexity Low/medium Low low/medium High [16]
Computat. complexity Low/medium Low Low High [16]
Inherited 2-D sources Yes No Yes Yes
Mobility required No No Yes Yes
Key rate High (10–35 bit per
observation) [31]
Dependson mobility (ex:
2–4 bit per
observation [18])
Dependson mobility (ex:
0.1 –0.8 bit per
observation [5])
Depends on mobility [16]
Performance at low SNR levels Low [16] Low [16] Medium [16] High [16]4.2.4. Runs test
Each run is represented as subsequence of the gener-
ated key s consisting of consecutive 0’s or consecutive 1’s.
The subsequence of consecutive 0’s is referred to as gap,
while the subsequence of 1’s is referred to as block. The
objective of this test is to check if the number of runs
of different lengths is as predicted for a random binary
sequence. The expected number of runs (either gaps or
blocks) of length j in the generated key s of length N is
ej = (N − i+ 3)2j.
4.2.5. Autocorrelation test
The objective of this test is to examine the correlation
between the generated secret key s and a shifted version of
itself.
4.2.6. Bit Mismatch Rate
The objective of this test is to estimate the bit mismatch
between the two sequences generated at Alice and Bob.
The BMR should be less than a threshold tomeet reliability
criteria.
5. Discussion
5.1. Current state-of-the-art
A main drawback in almost all of the existing physical
layer security techniques, whether it is based on channel
gain, RSS or distance, is their poor performance at low
signal to noise ratio (SNR). Estimating the channel gain at
low SNR levels will result in a high error due to the effect
of the AWGN. Similarly, for RSS case and consequently
distance estimation based on the RSS. Onemain advantage
of exploiting the AoA is their high estimation accuracy at
very low SNR levels resulting in a very low BMR compared
to other techniques at these low levels. This comes at the
cost of high hardware and computational complexities.
A qualitative comparison between exploiting different
common sources of randomness is presented in Table 1.
5.2. BMR simulation results
We test the BMR exploiting the most common physical
layer characteristics which are channel gain, channel
phase, RSS, azimuth angle and elevation angle. In addition
to that we combine the channel gain and phase and the
azimuth and elevation angles. The simulation settings for
Figs. 3 and 4 are:• We generate beacon signals at both Alice and Bob.
• The beacon signals are passed through a Rician fading
channel before adding AWGN. We chose a Rician
channel since its multipath comprises a line of sight,
which is required for AoA estimation such that the
environment secret key generation based on AoA is the
same for the channel.
• We estimate the RSS at both Alice and BoB.
• We estimate the channel gain and phase of the Rician
channel.
• We generate random azimuth and elevation angles
RMSE of up to two degree up to SNR = 15 dB. In
fact, this can be considered a high RMSE since most of
the AoA estimation techniques have a lower RMSE at
this SNR range. We chose to do so to accommodate the
worst case AoA estimation techniques.
• For a fair comparison between the different common
sources of randomness, we first scale the sequence of
information collected to the same scaling level such
that all common sources of randomness used below,
fluctuate within the same levels.
• We apply the steps in Fig. 2 to the encoding for RSS,
channel gain only, channel phase only, azimuth angle
only and elevation angle only. We add the combining
step when exploiting channel gain and phase and
azimuth and elevation angles as 2-D common sources
of randomness.
• After generating the secret key at Alice and Bob, the
BMR is calculated between the two keys.
• The simulation is run for 10000 iteration to estimate the
average BMR.
• We repeat the steps above to cover the SNR range of
interest.
• A threshold is added at BMR = 0.15 depicting a relia-
bility constraint on the BMR.
• The legends notations in Figs. 3 and 4 are presented in
Table 2.
The fusion operation : The objective of the fusion operation
is to combine the two common sources of randomness so
as to reduce the BMR after the quantization step, which
leads to a longer key. In addition, combining multiple
common sources of randomness increases the secret key
rate.
• We chose to combine the two common sources of
randomness in the bit stream level rather than as a raw
data.
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Fig. 3. BMR vs. SNR for different number of quantization bits: (a) 5 bits, (b) 6 bits, (c) 7 bits and (d) 8 bits.a b
c d
Fig. 4. BMR vs. SNR for different number of encoding bits: (a) 1 bits, (b) 2 bits, (c) 3 bits and (d) 4 bits.Table 2
Legend notations for Figs. 3 and 4.
A B C D E F G H
Chan. gain Chan. phase Az. angle. Elev. angle RSS Comb. gain. & ph Comb. Az. & Elev Thresh.
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such as AND, OR or concatenation can be applied on
the two bit streams to generate a single bit stream
containing both channel gain and phase and azimuth
and elevation angles.
• We choose to use concatenation operation with the
two bit streams as the inputs to generate the single bit
stream.
• To improve the BMR, before we concatenate, we drop
the least significant (nquan−ncombn) bits fromeach single
bit stream, where ncomb is the number of bits selected
from each bit stream.
It is worth noting that we chose a simple bit operation to be
applied on the bit streams for the sake of simplification. One
can apply a more complicated operation at the bit streams
such as bit masking or combinations of series and parallel
logical gates.
Fig. 3 shows the BMR for different nquan using nencod =
2 and ncomb = 5. Fig. 4 shows the BMR for different
nencod using nquan = 6 and ncomb = 5. We simulate the
secret key generation for the different common sources
of randomness up to the encoding step. It can be inferred
from the two figures that RSS based secret key generation
is achieving the worst results. As expected, as the number
of quantization bits increases, the BMR increases. Also, as
the number of encoding bits increases, the BMR decreases.
In addition to that a high SNR is required to achieve an
adequate BMR for the channel gain, channel phase and RSS.
The azimuth and elevation angles on the other hand can
operate with very low BMR at low SNR levels. It also can
be inferred that the information reconciliation step will be
more laborious in the case of channel gain only, channel
phase only andRSS than azimuth and elevation angles case.
In addition to that, a main advantage of exploiting
multiple common sources of randomness is that it can
drastically improve the BMR even when using a simple
bit operation such as concatenation after dropping the
LSBs. As can be seen, when combining both channel
gain and phase, the BMR improved significantly. Another
main advantage of exploiting multiple common sources
of randomness is that the key length will increase
substantially. More simulation results that address some
of the above metrics can be found in [32].
5.3. Roadmap to the future
Hybridization for key generation
As mentioned earlier, nodes can always benefit from
estimating multiple common sources of randomness
simultaneously. As shown earlier in the case of using angle
arrival as a common source of randomness, where two
independent angles were combined to generate the secret
key using a simple concatenation operation, the BMR
improved drastically. The problem of combining multiple
common sources of randomness whether as raw data or
bit streams remains an open research direction. Different
hybridization (i.e., combining) functions can be applied
on the multiple common sources of randomness with the
objective of minimizing the BMR and maximizing the key
entropy. In addition to that exploiting multiple commonsources of randomness adds an extra degree of freedom
to the legitimate nodes since the function, which they
will apply on the common sources of randomness will be
hidden from the eavesdropper.
Towards convergence of physical layer and cryptographic
secrecy
Till date, the two worlds of physical layer secrecy
and cryptographic secrecy speak two different languages.
While the former can only measure a non-vanishing se-
crecy capacity under the assumptions of infinitely long
keys without any key reuse and assuming an infinite com-
putation capabilities for the eavesdropper, the latter mea-
sures secrecy under finite computational capabilities of the
eavesdropper, finite key lengths andmandatory key reuse.
It would be highly desirable to find a way to converge the
two worlds in order to allow for practical comparisons be-
tween conventional cryptographic methods and relatively
recent physical layer secrecy based methods. There is a
potential to move the information theoretic measures of
the physical layer based methods towards more practical
measures using some approximate representations of se-
crecy capacity under certain allowable probabilities of key
breaking by the eavesdropper providing promising results
towards arriving at common secrecy measures that can be
used by the two worlds.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a survey on the most recent
physical layer characteristics used to generate the secret
key. We presented the steps needed to extract the secret
key from the estimated common source of randomness.
We then presented the metrics used to evaluate the
strength of the key. We studied the performance of
exploiting different common sources of randomness
through BMR simulation. We then presented a qualitative
comparison between them. In addition to that, we
discussed the open research problem within the subject.
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